

## HESIOD, ODYSSEUS, AND THE INSTRUCTION OF PRINCES

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It should no longer be necessary to point out the futility of any attempt to determine, from the texts alone, which passage was composed first: the lines of the *Theogony* proem which concern the Muse's gifts to kings (*Th.* 79–93) or Odysseus' reply to the inhospitable taunt of the Phaeacian youth Euryalos (*Od.* 8.166–77). Priority-hunting, based on subjective notions of what is artful in archaic Greek poetry, has failed to answer the dilemma. New methods of approach are needed.<sup>1</sup>

The two passages in question are the following:

ξείν', οὐ καλὸν ἔειπες· ἀτασθάλω ἀνδρὶ ἔοικας.  
οὕτως οὐ πάντεσσι θεοὶ χαρίεντα διδοῦσιν  
ἀνδράσιν, οὔτε φυὴν οὔτ' ἄρ' φρένας οὔτ' ἀγορητύν.  
ἄλλος μὲν γὰρ εἶδος ἀκιδνότερος πέλει ἀνὴρ,  
ἀλλὰ θεὸς μορφὴν ἔπεισι στέφει, οἳ δέ τ' ἐς αὐτὸν  
τερπόμενοι λεύσσοισιν· ὁ δ' ἀσφαλῆως ἀγορεύει  
αἰδοὶ μείλιχῆ, μετὰ δὲ πρέπει ἀγρομένοισιν,  
ἐρχόμενον δ' ἀνὰ ἄστρῳ θεὸν ὡς εἰσορόωσιν.  
ἄλλος δ' αὖ εἶδος μὲν ἀλίγκιος ἀθανάτοισιν,  
ἀλλ' οὔ οἱ χάρις ἀμφιπεριστέφεται ἐπέεσσιν,  
ὡς καὶ σοὶ εἶδος μὲν ἀριπρεπές, οὐδέ κεν ἄλλως  
οὐδὲ θεὸς τεύξειε, νόον δ' ἀποφώλιός ἐστι. (*Od.* 8.166–77)

Καλλιόπη θ'· ἡ δὲ προφερεστάτη ἐστὶν ἀπασέων.  
ἡ γὰρ καὶ βασιλεῦσιν ἅμ' αἰδοίοισιν ὀπηδεῖ.  
ὄντινα τιμήσουσι Διὸς κοῦραι μέγαλοιο  
γεινόμενον τε ἰδῶσι διοτρεφέων βασιλῆων,  
τῷ μὲν ἐπὶ γλώσση γλυκερὴν χεῖουσιν ἔερσην,  
τοῦ δ' ἔπε' ἐκ στόματος ρεῖ μείλιχα· οἳ δέ νυ λαοὶ  
πάντες ἐς αὐτὸν ὀρώσι διακρίνοντα θέμιστας  
ἰθείησι δίκησιν· ὁ δ' ἀσφαλῆως ἀγορεύων

<sup>1</sup> For the most complete bibliography on the problem, see H. Neitzel, "Zum zeitlichen Verhältnis von Theogonie (80–93) und Odyssee (8, 166–77)," *Philologus* 121 (1977) 24–44, to which add B. K. Braswell, "Odyssey 8.166–77 and Theogony 79–93," *CQ* 31 (1981) 237–39. On the problems of "borrowing" and "imitation" in an oral tradition, see R. Janko, *Homer, Hesiod, and the Hymns* (Cambridge 1982) 225.

αἰψά τι καὶ μέγα νεῖκος ἐπισταμένως κατέπαυσε·  
 τούνεκα γὰρ βασιλῆες ἐχέφρονες, οὔνεκα λαοῖς  
 βλαπτομένοις ἀγορήφι μετάτροπα ἔργα τελεῦσι  
 ῥηιδίως, μαλακοῖσι παραϊφάμενοι ἐπέεσσιν·  
ἐρχόμενον δ' ἀν' ἀγῶνα θεὸν ὡς ἰλάσκονται  
αἰδοῖ μειλιχίη μετὰ δὲ πρέπει ἀγορμένοισι.  
 τοίη Μουσάων ἱερὴ δόσις ἀνθρώποισιν. (Th. 79–93)

The passages share two and one-half verses. If we rule out the chance occurrence of such similar diction and the notion of borrowing, one possibility remains: parallel inheritance from a single common source. There is a way to agree with the Analysts that the resemblances here are not coincidental, while avoiding the critical traps of “imitation,” “adaptation,” or “borrowing.” As G. P. Edwards concludes, “We can never rule out the existence of an older place X, which provided a common source for both A and B at the lines in question, so making their chronological relationship impossible to determine.”<sup>2</sup> I cannot claim to have discovered a poem which serves as the common source for the *Theogony* and *Odyssey* passages, but I can go beyond Edwards’s essentially negative conclusion: the two passages under consideration can be said to share a common *genre*, which generates the similar phrases in each place. By analyzing Greek and Old Irish texts, I propose to pinpoint the genre from which both Homer and Hesiod draw.

The generic elements to which I refer are best understood as belonging to “genres of discourse,” to use the phrase of the critic Tzvetan Todorov.<sup>3</sup> He insists, first, that a genre is an institution of society, and so should interest historians and anthropologists as well as literary critics; the link between genre and social life will be important for the problem at hand.<sup>4</sup> Second, Todorov points out that genre is simply the “historically attested codification of discursive properties” such as setting, addressee, speaker, diction, rhythm, and theme, the variables of any speech-act; in literature, these

<sup>2</sup> G. P. Edwards, *The Language of Hesiod in its Traditional Context* (Oxford 1971) 189. Several scholars are careful to point out the possibility of common borrowing from tradition as regards these two passages: cf. J. Duban, “Poets and Kings in the *Theogony* Invocation,” *QUCC* n.s. 4 (1980) 12, note 11; P. Walcot, “Hesiod and the Law,” *SO* 38 (1963) 11f. and *Hesiod and the Near East* (Cardiff 1966) 124f.; M. L. West, *Hesiod: Theogony* (Oxford 1966) 183; the tradition involved is not specified by them. Concerning the *Theogony* passage, Edwards, while not denying the possibility of common inheritance, accepts earlier arguments for Homeric priority: see p. 168f.

<sup>3</sup> T. Todorov applies the notion to a range of modern works in *Les Genres du discours* (Paris 1978): see p. 51 for his definition of the term; and, for further comparison of rules of discourse with those of genre, see Todorov, “La Notion de littérature,” in *Langue, discours, société*, ed. J. Kristeva (Paris 1975) 362f. Other useful work might be done, using Todorov’s notion, to recover the themes and diction appropriate to an archaic Greek system of genres. For a working model in one genre, see C. O. Pavese, *La Lirica corale greca* (Rome 1979).

<sup>4</sup> Todorov (above, note 3) 49. On genre as convention and institution, see the analysis of W. Raible, “Was sind Gattungen?,” *Poetica* 12 (1980) 326.

variables happen to be more rigidly defined and selected than they are in ordinary discourse. It is useful to think of genre, then, as a type of selective coding.<sup>5</sup> I will return to this notion later in this paper. Suffice it to say for now that genre, because it is related to discourse, is implicit in any literary production: behind the words of a poem lie unspoken assumptions regarding the context and manner of communication proper to a given location, occasion, and interlocutors.

At times, this generic affiliation might be marked out by diction or syntax; the use of vocatives, for instance, is a traditional element in Greek poetic *paraenesis* from Homer on. At other times, the dramatic context by itself can mark a discourse as properly belonging to a certain genre, since the presence of speakers with a particular status naturally arouses generic expectations. The marking of a discourse as appropriate for a particular genre can occur even though the discourse is embedded within a composition of an entirely different genre. Thus, in the medium of Homeric poetry, where changes of speaker occur frequently, it is theoretically possible that each speaker's discourse show signs of belonging to a particular genre. Nestor and Phoenix, for instance, are not just advisors: they become conduits for the genre of paraenetic poetry; Andromache, Hecuba, and Helen are not just lamenting women, but speakers of lament poetry *within* epic—poetry which has a long and old tradition *outside* epic as well, a tradition most likely as old as epic, with its own conventions and stylizations of language, as Alexiou has shown.<sup>6</sup> Although it may seem mechanical to describe epic characters in terms of their poetic affiliations in this way, such a view might help us to understand how such massive compositions as the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* attained their bulk: by the introduction of pre-existing or contemporary non-epic genres. This mode of composition is exactly what gives both Homeric poems their convincingly realistic tone, producing in the audience the sense that actual words are being reported by the Muse (as the poet's ideology would declare). Stylized discourse, be it lament, advice, praise or blame, is incorporated and preserved in the medium of Homeric hexameter verse.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Raible (above, note 4) 325, 335–43 notes that genres, like texts and words themselves, are characterized by selection and abbreviation of elements in a system. From the perspective of a semiotician, Raible defines genre as a set of distinctive marks drawn from as many as six dimensions, including communication-situation.

<sup>6</sup> M. Alexiou, *The Ritual Lament in Greek Tradition* (Cambridge 1974) 4–13, 161–84. F. Mawet, “Épigrammes, thrènes et dithyrambes: les lamentations funèbres de l'épopée,” in *Le Monde grec: Hommages à Claire Preaux*, ed. J. Bingen et al. (Brussels 1975) 42ff., also traces elements of distinct genres *within* epic laments, raising the possibility that epic evolved from laments.

<sup>7</sup> On the versatility of Homeric poetry in integrating various traditions, see G. Nagy, *The Best of the Achaeans: Concepts of the Hero in Archaic Greek Poetry* (Baltimore 1979) 6 (hereafter BA). D. Sinos, *Achilles, Patroklos, and the Meaning of Philos* (Innsbruck 1980) 75 and note 5, illustrates some ways in which the *Iliad* subsumes other traditional

One more thing needs to be emphasized before I return to pinpoint the genre of *Od.* 8.166ff. and *Th.* 79–93. It is a working principle of oral poetics that theme creates diction and similar themes create similar diction.<sup>8</sup> By attributing certain themes to genres of discourse, I am adding another level to the hierarchy of traditional modes of expression in archaic Greek poetry. The lowest level of this hierarchy—the word or phrase—is often labeled *formula*, but one might call any one of these levels of expression “formulaic.”

With reference to the problem with which we began, then, I would claim that similar themes produce the resemblances. The themes are generated by a common source, an ancient genre of discourse, which has a basis in social fact of considerable antiquity, the discourse between a king (or advisor) and a prince.

This genre has long been called “Instruction of Princes” (or *speculum principum*); its wide attestation is surveyed by West in his edition of the *Works and Days*, the best surviving reflection of the genre in Greek. We know that similar compositions in Greek once existed, especially from the fragments of a poem called the *Instructions of Cheiron* attributed to Hesiod (fr. 283–85 MW). The high status of the *Kheirônos Hupothêkai* as a source for instruction-poetry is evident in Pindar’s “citation” of the poem at *Pyth.* 6.19–26:

σύ τοι σχεθῶν νιν ἐπὶ δεξιὰ χειρός, ὄρθαν  
 ἄγεις ἐφημοσύναν,  
 τὰ ποτ’ ἐν οὔρεσι φαντὶ μεγαλοσθενεῖ  
 Φιλύρας υἷον ὄρφανίζομένῳ  
 Πηλείδα παραιεῖν· μάλιστα μὲν Κρονίδαυ,  
 βαρύοπα στεροπᾶν κεραινῶν τε πρύτανιν,  
 θεῶν σέβεσθαι.

Both the extant *Works and Days* and the fragmentary *Instructions of Cheiron* accord with other examples of this genre, in many literatures, in their concern with transmitting the rules for proper legal, religious,

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genres. Further on problems of genre-interaction in early Greek poetry: J. Latacz, *Kampfparänese, Kampfdarstellung und Kampfwirklichkeit in der Ilias, bei Kallinos und Tyrtaios* (Munich 1977) 1–20; H. Diller, *Die dichterische Form von Hesiods Erga* (Mainz 1962) 44–46, 58; M. Puelma, “Sänger und König,” *MH* 29 (1972) 86f. (on genre *ainos*); Nagy, *BA* 235–41.

<sup>8</sup> See A. Lord, *The Singer of Tales* (Cambridge, Mass. 1960) 49: “Formulas are, after all, the means of expressing the themes of the poetry.” Nagy, *BA* 1–6, is a concise statement of the interworking of theme and diction in archaic Greek material. I have sketched the relationship of theme to motif and phrase, within several European traditions, in “The Oral Tradition” (forthcoming in *Critical Survey of Poetry*, ed. F. Magill). The shared verses of the passages at hand are not “formulaic” in terms of phrase repetition (except for *Od.* 8.173 = *Th.* 91, a fairly frequent phrase: cf. F. Krafft, *Vergleichende Untersuchungen zu Homer und Hesiod* [Göttingen 1963] 69, note 1).

political, and social behavior.<sup>9</sup> While the *Works and Days*, along with similar poetry such as the elegiacs of Theognis, has long been recognized as *hupothêkai*, commentators on the *Theogony* have treated the poem as a compendium of lore about myth and cosmology, rightly noting its links with other theogonic texts but neglecting the frame-narrative, which includes the proem.<sup>10</sup> To my knowledge, the possibility of an embedded genre of instruction-poetry within the *Theogony* or the *Odyssey* has not been addressed.

To turn to the passages: what specifically marks these portions of the *Odyssey* and the *Theogony* as appropriate to a shared Instruction of Princes genre? Three elements occur in both which are closely similar in phrasing or situation. The first two are thematic and generate the shared diction; they comprise the theme of faultless speaking ability (*asphalêôs agoreuei*: *Od.* 8.171 and *Th.* 86) and that of “honey-sweet respect” (*aidôi meilikhiêi*: *Od.* 8.172 and *Th.* 92). The third element is dramatic context, which generates the “looking on” motif (*Od.* 8.173 and *Th.* 85, 91). I shall discuss this later. The first two elements can be traced within poetry explicitly designated as “instructions”—the speaking-theme in the cognate Indo-European tradition of Old Irish poetry, and the *aidôs*-theme within Greek tradition.

First, the speech theme. The Old Irish literary genre called *teosc* (“instruction”) comprises five principal compositions, the earliest of which, *Audacht Morainn*, dates from A.D. 700 and is therefore the earliest Western European specimen of the *speculum* genre. The *Audacht Morainn* (“Testament of Morann”) purports to be the death-bed instructions of the mythical first Irish lawmaker, Morann, to Neire, his foster-son, for transmission to the young king Feradach Find Fechnach. Irish tradition itself casts this poetry as an inheritance from deep antiquity; in fact, the *Audacht* contains nothing but pre-Christian material, and, in the words of

<sup>9</sup> See M. West, *Hesiod: Works and Days* (Oxford 1978) 7, 14–18. In terms of Raible’s definition of genre (above, note 4), one could describe prince-instruction as set in a particular communication-situation (older man advising younger, usually at a point of crisis or initiation), with an open-ended structure (e.g. strings of injunctions), presented as either direct conversation or as a testament, governed by hierarchical order (injunctions in order of importance), with a “real” purpose (i.e. the genre presents itself as factual and necessary for world order). On the contents of the *Kheirônos Hupothêkai*, see J. Schwartz, *Pseudo-Hesiodica* (Leiden 1960) 241 and G. Nagy, “Hesiod,” in *Ancient Writers*, ed. T. J. Luce, vol. 1 (New York 1982) 61f.

<sup>10</sup> P. Friedlander, “HYΠΟΘΗΚΑΙ,” *Hermes* 48 (1913) 558–616, outlines the similarities. On the inadequacy of the commonplace description of the *WD* as merely “instructions” or “wisdom literature,” see R. Hunt, “Hesiod as Satirist,” *Helios* n.s. 8 (1981) 29–40, esp. 38f. An exception to the usual treatment of the *Theogony* is M. Detienne’s analysis of the work as a praise-poem directed to Zeus as king: *Les Maîtres de vérité dans la Grèce archaïque* (Paris 1967) 17f.

Calvert Watkins, is a “window on a genre of Indo-European literature.”<sup>11</sup> The core of the *Audacht Morainn* deals with the notion of the Ruler’s Truth, a force brought into life by the king’s verbal behavior, which ensures the prosperity and abundance of a society. This notion has exact cognates, both in semantics and syntactical expression, in Indo-Iranian and in Greek poetry, as Watkins shows, citing for the latter literature the *Works and Days*, wherein the fable of the hawk and the nightingale (WD 203–12) is explicitly directed to the kings and has as its main concern the contrast between “straight” and “crooked” *dikê*.<sup>12</sup> Straight *dikê* leads to an ideal state of plenty:

οἱ δὲ δίκας ξείνοισι καὶ ἐνδήμοισι διδοῦσιν  
 ἰθείας καὶ μὴ τι παρεκβαίνουσι δίκαιον,  
 τοῖσι τέθηλε πόλις, λαοὶ δ’ ἀνθεύσιν ἐν αὐτῇ·  
 εἰρήνη δ’ ἀνὰ γῆν κουροτρόφος, οὐδέ ποτ’ αὐτοῖς  
 ἀργαλέον πόλεμον τεκμαίρεται εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς·  
 οὐδέ ποτ’ ἰθυδικησι μετ’ ἀνδράσι λιμὸς ὀπηδεῖ  
 οὐδ’ ἄτη, θαλίης δὲ μεμηλότα ἔργα νέμονται.  
 τοῖσι φέρει μὲν γαῖα πολὺν βίον, οὔρεσι δὲ δρύς  
 ἄκρη μὲν τε φέρει βαλάνους, μέσση δὲ μελίσσας·  
 εἰροπόκοι δ’ ὄιες μαλλοῖς καταβεβρίθασι·  
 τίκτουσιν δὲ γυναικες εὐκότα τέκνα γονεῦσι. (WD 225–35)

This opposition of good and bad justice is mirrored in Old Irish instruction poetry, where one is told the many results of *fírbretha* as opposed to *góbretha* (true and false judgments). The results of the latter are often painfully elaborated; the true judgments lead to increased yields of milk, fish, corn, and fair children.<sup>13</sup>

Watkins also mentions the other striking appearance of the Ruler’s Truth notion in archaic Greek poetry: the words of Odysseus to Penelope in which he details the results of an ideal king’s good rule:<sup>14</sup>

<sup>11</sup> C. Watkins, “*Is tre fír fíathemon*: Marginalia to *Audacht Morainn*,” *Ériu* 30 (1979) 182. Further on the antiquity of this text: F. Kelly, ed., *Audacht Morainn* (Dublin 1976) xv (hereafter *AM*) and P. Henry, “The Cruces of *Audacht Morainn*,” *ZCP* 39 (1982) 35 (on the relation of *Morainn* to the Vedic figure of *Varuna*). On the relation between early Irish kings and judges, including *Morainn*, see H. Wagner, “Studies in the Origins of Early Celtic Civilisation,” *ZCP* 31 (1970) 1–45 and D. A. Binchy, *Celtic and Anglo-Saxon Kingship* (Oxford 1970) 4–16. Note that the Irish instruction is specifically to a foster-son, in the *AM* and elsewhere, a detail identical with the tradition that Cheiron instructed Achilles, Jason, et al. in a type of fosterage. The motif of Achilles’ fosterage is an Indo-European relic, according to E. Campanile, *Studi di cultura celtica e indoeuropea* (Pisa 1981) 32–34.

<sup>12</sup> Watkins (above, note 11) 183, 192f.

<sup>13</sup> See sections 12–21 *AM*, apparently the oldest section in the text, according to Kelly (above, note 11) 6f.

<sup>14</sup> Watkins (above, note 11) 192; cf. Kelly (above, note 11) xvii. For evidence concerning the high antiquity of Greek kingship traditions as reflected in the *Odyssey* 19 passage, see R. Mondì, “Skêptoukhoi Basileis: An Argument for Divine Kingship in Early Greece,”

Τὴν δ' ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη πολύμητις Ὀδυσσεύς·  
 “ὦ γύναι, οὐκ ἄν τις σε βροτῶν ἐπ' ἀπίρονα γαῖαν  
 νεικέει· ἧ γάρ σευ κλέος οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἰκάνει,  
 ὡς τέ τευ ἦ βασιλῆος ἀμύμονος, ὃς τε θεοῦδης  
 ἀνδράσιν ἐν πολλοῖσι καὶ ἰφθίμοισιν ἀνάσσω  
 εὐδικίας ἀνέχῃσι, φέρῃσι δὲ γαῖα μέλαινα  
 πυροῦς καὶ κριθάς, βρίθῃσι δὲ δένδρεα καρπῶ,  
 τίκτηη δ' ἔμπεδα μῆλα, θάλασσα δὲ παρέχῃ ἰχθύς  
 ἐξ εὐηγείσης, ἀρετῶσι δὲ λαοὶ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. (Od. 19.106–114)

This passage, apparently a digression in the interview between husband and wife on Ithaca, will turn out to be a key element in Odysseus' revelation. We have seen, then, that Old Irish and Greek instructional poetry—the *Audacht Morainn* and the *Works and Days*—both contain one inherited theme concerning the abundance resulting from the power of a good king, and that the same theme appears in the *Odyssey*. The point which I wish to make involves the same spread of attestation, with the substitution of the *Theogony* proem for the *Works and Days* passage.

In *Audacht Morainn*, it is implicit that the *fír flathemon* is verbally expressed by the king. There is evidence, in fact, from the twelfth century that a king actually recited or assented to the proverbial statements and injunctions of a *tecosc* during his inauguration ceremony. It may help us to appreciate the social parallels in the Greek and Irish situations for instruction-poetry if we note that such Irish inaugurations involved the passing of a rod, symbol of sovereignty, from a poet to the new king: the rod thus resembles the *skêptron*, not only in its close connection with kingship, but also in its relation to authoritative poetic speech. The Irish king is certified by the poet; reciprocally, the poet is maintained by the king and tribe. A similar relationship lies behind the proem to the *Theogony*, a poem resembling an inauguration ode for Zeus and detailing (as did Irish odes) the king's genealogy and battle prowess. Hesiod's gift of a *skêptron* from the Muses (*Th.* 30) is a gift from their father, Zeus, and gets as its recompense the gift of the *Theogony* itself, which authorizes the divine king.<sup>15</sup>

Explicitly as well, the *Audacht* presents instructions on the role of speaking in kingship. After discoursing of the prosperity that the Ruler's Truth accomplishes, Morann gives Feradach a string of admonitions:

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*Arethusa* 13 (1980) 203–16; on kingship as a relic institution at the composition of Homeric epic, see R. Drews, *Basileus: The Evidence for Kingship in Geometric Greece* (New Haven and London 1983) 105f., 144; on heritage of Greek kingship, see Detienne (above, note 10) 42–50.

<sup>15</sup> On the Irish inauguration ceremonies and other king-rituals, see Kelly (above, note 11) 14; M. Dillon, “The Consecration of Irish Kings,” *Celtica* 10 (1973) 1–8; and F. Byrne, *Irish Kings and High Kings* (London 1973) 7–27, esp. 15ff. On the meaning of Hesiod's *skêptron*, see Duban (above, note 2) 7 and Puelma (above, note 7) 94, both of whom also notice the parallel action of poets and kings in the description of the Muse's gifts (*Th.* 79–103).

Apair fris, (a) ba trócar, (b) bad fírión, (c) bad chosmuil, (d) bad chuibsech, (e) bad fósath, (f) bad eslabar, (g) bad garte, (h) bad fíalainech, (i) bad séssach, (j) bad lessach, (k) bad éitir, (l) bad inric, (m) *bad súthnge*, (n) *bad foruste*, (o) *bad fírbrethach*.

Tell him, let him be (a) merciful, (b) just, (c) impartial, (d) conscientious, (e) firm, (f) generous, (g) hospitable, (h) honourable, (i) stable, (j) beneficent, (k) capable, (l) honest, (m) *well-spoken*, (n) *steady*, (o) *true-judging*. (*AM* sect. 55, ed. Kelly)

The final three are of particular interest here: “let him be well-spoken, steady, true-judging.” For, semantically, we have here the exact pairing of the Greek phrase *asphaleôs agoreuei*.<sup>16</sup> The notion of true judgment, central to the Hesiodic description of ideal kingship in the *Theogony* passage (cf. especially *Th.* 85–90), in the *AM* immediately follows the phrases concerning speech—as is proper for the ideology of a culture in which tribal king and judge are closely allied.<sup>17</sup>

Examples can be multiplied to show that speaking well and truthfully is traditionally important advice in Irish Instruction of Princes. The *Senbríathra Fithail* (“proverbs” of the pagan judge Fithail), another *tecosc* text, has among its formulas the following: *adcota miltenga brithemnacht* (“A sweet tongue begets judgment”). We can note in this formula the association, as in the *Theogony* proem, of the king’s speech with judgment. Furthermore, the word *miltenga*—literally “honey-tongue”—appears to

<sup>16</sup> The adverb *asphaleôs* is especially important because, in the diction of the *Theogony*, only Gaia and Uranos bear the adjective form as epithet: as Duban notes (above, note 2, p. 19), this implies that “the king’s ‘unerring’ pronouncements are the moral safeguard to the universe’s physical stability”; he parallels the king’s effectiveness in *Od.* 19.109ff., a passage which we have already seen is derived from archaic prince-instruction material. Old Irish *foruste*, the word translated here as “steady,” might be further glossed “unmoved because rooted in tradition,” as the noun *forus*, from which the adjective is derived, has particular reference to abstruse knowledge, especially of legal precedents and lore: cf. *Dictionary of the Irish Language* (Dublin 1913–76) “F,” col. 373 s.v., sections *b* and *c*. On the importance of such “steadiness” in the context of kingship, cf. the evidence of a third cognate tradition (ancient India) as seen in, e.g., *RV* 10.173.4, noted by B. Schlerath, *Das Königtum im Rig- und Atharvaveda* (Wiesbaden 1960) 118. The lack of cognate linguistic *expressions* for these identical themes in the three traditions cited (Irish, Greek, Indic) should not be taken as proof that the complex of ideas regarding kings developed late and independently in each dialect of Indo-European, as semantic structures are often retained despite surface lexical renewal: cf. C. Watkins, “Aspects of Indo-European Poetics,” in *Indo-European Studies* IV, ed. C. Watkins (Cambridge, Mass. 1981) 764–99, esp. 780, 794.

<sup>17</sup> The *Audacht* presents the ruler not only as possessing the mystical *fír flathemon*, upon which justice is based, but also as setting legal precedents in the matter of fees, obligations, honor-price, and so forth (cf. sections 47–52 *AM*). At the same time, the existence of independent judges appears to be acknowledged (cf. section 23, “Let him not exalt any judge unless he knows the true legal precedents,” Kelly [above, note 11] 8–9).



contain the exact notion found in *meilikhios*, a key adjective in the Greek passages in question.<sup>18</sup>

The “Battle of Airtech” (*Cath Airtig*) contains the *tecosc* given by Conall Cernach to Cuscraid Mend Macha as the latter assumes the kingship. After the instructions concerning proper gift-bestowal and assembly-holding, the new king is enjoined as follows:<sup>19</sup>

Bat eolai in gech berlae ar narbat ainfis i nnach  
dán conruidfe a fritacra friut.  
Bat firen fírbrethach cen forbrisiu n-indsciu etir  
tethrai trén (ocus) trúg.

Be skilled in every tongue, so thou be not ignorant in any art that  
one will speak in argument with thee.  
Be just and righteous in judgment, not supressing speech between the  
*tethra* of the strong and the weak.

As in *Audacht Morainn*, instruction on speech is immediately followed by advice concerning judgment (with the same word used: *fírbrethach* = “true-judging”). It should be pointed out that in both the *Audacht* and the *Battle of Airtech*, the instructions to the king are embedded in a narrative, as I believe is also the case in the *Odyssey*. In my final Irish example, the embedded *tecosc* is less well integrated with its narrative, a sign that the story-teller is indeed borrowing from another genre to fill out his tale. In a section of the *Wasting Sickness of Cú Chulainn* (*Serglige Con Culainn*), the hero instructs his foster-son Lugaid, who has been chosen as next king of Tara by an unusual bull-feast divination ceremony:<sup>20</sup>

<sup>18</sup> On this formula see R. Smith, “The *Senbriathra Fithail* and Related Texts,” *Revue Celtique* 45 (1928) 14. Although *meilikhios* is probably *not* related to the Greek word for “honey” (*meli*), as Chantraine showed (“Grec *meilikhios*,” in *Mél. Boisacq* I [Brussels 1937] 169–74), there is no doubt that an association between the two word-groups has developed by the time of the composition of the *Theogony* proem (cf. lines 83–84: the Muses pour dew on the king’s tongue and his words pour forth ‘*meilikha*’). Compare also the Homeric description of Nestor’s voice at *Il.* 1.249, a poetic detail which may be of Indo-European date, on which see R. Schmitt, *Dichtung und Dichtersprache in Indo-germanischer Zeit* (Wiesbaden 1967) 256. Finally, on the association of honey and *true* speech, see S. Scheinberg, “The Bee Maidens of the Homeric Hymn to Hermes,” *HSCP* 83 (1979) 16–23; and on the symbolic value of honey in the *Theogony* in relation to speech, see P. Pucci, *Hesiod and the Language of Poetry* (Baltimore and London 1977) 19–21.

<sup>19</sup> “The Battle of Airtech,” ed. and transl. R. Best, *Ériu* 8 (1916) 173. The obscure word *tethrai* may mean “paragons”: cf. *Dictionary of the Irish Language* (above, note 16) s.v. “2 *tethra*.” Compare the similar injunction, also in context of judging, contained in *Tecosca Cormaic* (Instructions of Cormac): *eolas cech berla*, “knowledge of each language,” is one of the essentials for the tribe’s welfare. (Text in *Book of Leinster*, vol. 6, ed. A. Sullivan [Dublin 1983] 343c13.)

<sup>20</sup> *Serglige Con Culainn*, ed. M. Dillon (Dublin 1975) 9; the translation is by M. Dillon, “Wasting Sickness of Cu Chulainn,” *Scottish Gaelic Studies* 7 (1951) 57, who notes uncertainties ad loc. Once again, the addressee is a foster-son: cf. above, note 11.

26. Ní fresnesea co labur.  
 Ní aisnéisea co glórach.  
 Ní fuirse.  
 Ní chuitbe.  
 Ní faithchithher senóri.

Be not haughty in contradiction.  
 Be not loud in telling.  
 Do not play the buffoon.  
 Do not mock.  
 Do not threaten old men. . . . (SCC 278ff.)

This portion of Cú Chulainn's instructions centers, once more, on the proper verbal behavior for kings. Although the contexts differ in the *Wasting Sickness* and the *Odyssey* passages, both Cú Chulainn and Odysseus instruct their young prince interlocutors to speak in a respectful, restrained manner. In Greek terms, this means having *aidôs*; this brings us to the second theme shared by the *Odyssey* and *Theogony* passages with which we began.

*Aidôs* is an important topic of Prince Instruction, as can be seen more clearly when we turn from the shame culture of ancient Ireland to that of archaic Greece. Hesiod's *Works and Days*, as we have seen, is an explicitly instructional composition. It is significant, given this context, that the poem dramatizes the negative *exemplum* of the Fifth Age in terms of *aidôs*: the era is to be marked by a complete failure of reciprocal relationships (WD 182–91) usually observed between family members, *xεινοί*, and parties to oaths:

δίκη δ' ἐν χερσὶ καὶ αἰδῶς  
 οὐκ ἔσται, βλάψει δ' ὁ κακὸς τὸν ἀρείονα φῶτα  
 μύθοισι σκολοῖς ἐνέπων, ἐπι δ' ὄρκον ὁμείται. (WD 192–94)

*Aidôs* is clearly a matter of proper verbal behavior here; the man who lacks this quality speaks “crooked words” in harming his betters. The description of the Fifth Age closes with another reference to *aidôs*, this time in the symbolic departure from earth of the goddess, accompanied by Nemesis (WD 199–200). Finally, before proceeding to the specific instructions of the poem's latter part, Hesiod directs to his brother Perses a short exhortation concerning *aidôs*:

αἰδῶς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ κεχρημένον ἄνδρα κομίζει,  
 αἰδῶς, ἢ τ' ἄνδρας μέγα σίνεται ἢ δ' ὀνύησιν  
 αἰδῶς τοι πρὸς ἀνολβίη, θάρσος δὲ πρὸς ὄλβῳ. (WD 317–19)

In contrast to the preceding portions of the poem, in which *aidôs* is a virtue, these lines present the other side of the notion, by a particularly Hesiodic splitting of the abstract qualities into “good” and “bad” (cf. the section on Eris, WD 11–26; also, Nemesis, at *Th.* 223 is a pain for mortals, whereas at WD 200 it is implicitly good). But this contrast is not a

contradiction: the problem arises when some people have *aidôs* while others lack it; the very existence of the notion means that it can be used for good or ill (just as an oath “does harm” to humans in general when someone swears falsely: *Th.* 231f.). Hésiod is not urging Perses to dispense with *aidôs*; to the contrary, his discussion ends with a reference to the disastrous consequences of “shamelessness” (*anaideiê*) overpowering *aidôs* (*WD* 324ff.): the gods diminish the life and wealth of that man who gets *olbos* with violence. In the light of this conclusion, *WD* 319, *αἰδώς τοι πρὸς ἀνολβίῃ, θάρσος δὲ πρὸς ὄλβῳ*, should be read as a bitterly ironic piece of advice: “*aidôs* for poverty, boldness for wealth.” Hésiod is on the side of *aidôs*; boldness (*tharsos*) is synonymous in this context with “taking *olbos* by force” in line 321, the short-term worldly success with long-term disadvantages. This portion of the *Works and Days*, then, is just as much prince-instruction on *aidôs* as is the preceding description of the Fifth Age.

The poetic genre which I have posited as the source of the similar passages from the *Theogony* proem and from *Odyssey* Book 8 is continued after Hésiod’s time in the instructional poetry of Theognis of Megara.<sup>21</sup> It should not be surprising, then, to find that the theme of proper *aidôs* bulks large in the later tradition. Even though Theognidean poetry is addressed to the *polis* of Megara, through the foil-figure Kyrnos, the connection with the old tradition of prince-instruction is maintained through such formal characteristics of Theognidean poetry as the exhortations to remember (e.g. Theognis 27–30), the aphoristic style (e.g. 143–54), and, over all, the communication situation (an old man advises a young one) which frames the poetry.

Just as in the *Works and Days*, *aidôs* in Theognis’ verse is conspicuous by being absent. Compare with *WD* 192ff. this description of the *present* day in Theognis:<sup>22</sup>

Νῦν δὲ τὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν κακὰ γίνεται ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν  
 ἀνδρῶν· ἡγέονται δ’ ἐκτραπέλοισι νόμοις·  
αἰδῶς μὲν γὰρ ὄλωλεν, ἀναιδείη δὲ καὶ ὕβρις  
 νικῆσασα δίκην γῆν κατὰ πᾶσαν ἔχει. (289–92)

More important for the present question, in Theognis as well *aidôs* is regularly associated with proper speech. The famous lines promising immortality to Kyrnos conclude with a complaint in which the boy’s lack of *aidôs* is equated precisely with the wrong verbal behavior, deceptive speech:

<sup>21</sup> See Friedländer (above, note 10) 573ff. My view of the poetic relationship among Kyrnos, Theognis, and Megara owes much to the work of Nagy, “Theognis of Megara: The Poet as Seer, Pilot, and Revenant,” *Arethusa* 15 (1982) 109–28.

<sup>22</sup> The opposition *aidôs* vs. *hubris* is traditional in Homeric diction: cf. A. Cheyns, “Sens et valeurs du mot *aidôs* dans les contextes homériques,” in *Recherches de philologie et de linguistique*, ed. M. Hofinger (Louvain 1967) esp. 9f. Cheyns further compares Euryalos with Thersites, another reviler of kings: both can be said to embody *hubris*.

αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν ὀλίγησ παρὰ σεῦ οὐ τυγχάνω αἰδοῦς,  
ἀλλ' ὥσπερ μικρὸν παῖδα λόγοις μ' ἀπατᾶς. (253f.)

In exchange for immortality, Theognis' poetry elicits the properly mature use of respectful speech, bestowing a gift of words on the listener in two ways: externally (through *kleos*, 245f.) and internally through an instruction in proper speech.

The connection between speech and *aidôs* is made even more clearly in lines 83ff.:<sup>23</sup>

Τούτους οὐχ' εὔροις διζήμενος οὐδ' ἐπὶ πάντας  
ἀνθρώπους, οὐς ναῦς μὴ μία πάντας ἄγοι,  
οἷσιν ἐπὶ γλώσση τε καὶ ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἔπεστιν  
αἰδῶς, οὐδ' αἰσχρὸν χρῆμ' ἐπὶ κέρδος ἄγει.

Finally, the similarity of diction between the lines just quoted and the following piece of Theognidean instruction justifies us in treating as nearly synonymous *aidôs* and *to meilikhon*:

Ἴσχε νόω, γλώσσης δὲ τὸ μείλικhon αἶεν ἐπέστω·  
δειλῶν τοι τελέθει καρδίη ὄξυτέρη. (365f.)

Thus, Theognis is operating with the same concepts and poetic diction as Homer and Hesiod: recall the recurring phrase *aidoi meilikhiêi*, which joins the two concepts that are complementary in Theognis, each concept having a special association with speech.<sup>24</sup>

We have seen so far that *aidôs* is a proper topic for instructional poetry, as both the *Works and Days* and Theognis show; that *aidôs* has a special association with speech; and that there is an established traditional diction surrounding instruction on *aidôs*. The relevance of these points to the discussion of *Od.* 8.166ff. and *Th.* 79ff. should be clear: in both of the passages *aidôs* arises precisely in the context of a speech-act, one which involves, explicitly, an audience and a speaker.

Now the dative of manner, *aidoi meilikhiêi*, has long been seen to function differently in each passage: in *Od.* 8.172 it certainly describes the speaker's behavior, whereas in *Th.* 92 it describes audience reaction. To my mind, this is simply a powerful confirmation of the essentially reciprocal quality of *aidôs*, not a mistake on the part of an adapting poet

<sup>23</sup> Lines 85–86 exhibit the traditional association of *aidôs* and sight, on which see J. Gould, "Hiketeia," *JHS* 93 (1973) 88, note 74. Compare also the role of sight in both *Th.* 85 and *Od.* 8.173, in which the respectful "looking-on" is generated by *aidôs*.

<sup>24</sup> The phrase *aidoi meilikhiêi* thus resembles formulaic phrases of the type *aithomenon pur*, in which the adjective expresses the essential quality of the noun. In light of the semantics of *aidôs* (quintessentially reciprocal) I suggest that *meilikhios* (etymology unknown: cf. above, note 18) is related to the IE root \**mei-* (cf. Lat. *munus*, Skt. *Mitra*), the semantics of which are analysed by E. Benveniste, "Don et échange dans le vocabulaire indo-européen," in *Problèmes de linguistique générale*, vol. 1 (Paris 1966) 315–26, esp. 322f.

as critics hunting the “original” passage would have it.<sup>25</sup> As J. P. Gould has noted, *aidôs* is one of many Greek words “where reciprocity of usage implies reciprocity of behavior and attitude in the situation of which the word is used: the feeling of *aidôs*, we may say, is common to both parties in the encounter, or . . . characteristic of the encounter itself.”<sup>26</sup>

It is easy to see how a speaker uses *aidôs*—in knowing when and how to speak. At *Od.* 8.166ff., Odysseus upbraids Euryalos precisely because the younger man has spoken without *aidôs*. Odysseus then goes on to exhibit the quality himself in deftly turning a personal attack into a general comment that yet has a pointed, hidden message for the young prince. This same episode on Phaeacia can help us to understand how the audience in the speech-act, the *laoi*, show *aidôs* (as the Hesiodic description says they do). At *Od.* 7.69–72 is a description of the queen, Arete:

*ὥς κείνη περὶ κῆρι τετίμηται τε καὶ ἔστιν  
ἕκ τε φίλων παίδων ἕκ τ' αὐτοῦ Ἀλκινόοιο  
καὶ λαῶν, οἳ μὲν ῥα θεὸν ὥς εἰσορόωντες  
δειδέχεται μύθοισιν, ὅτε στείχησ' ἀνὰ ἄστν.*

It obviously shares the Homeric and Hesiodic motif of “looking on one as a god.” The reference to greeting with words (*deidekhatai muthoisin*) contains the same idea as *Th.* 91 *hilaskontai aidôi meilikhiêi*: the *laoi*, inspired by *aidôs*, know how and when to make their requests. Once again, speech and *aidôs* are closely related; the phrase *aidoi meilikhiêi* refers to both the form and the content of speech, and is an ellipsis for “*aidôs* which expresses itself in *epea meilikhia*.”<sup>27</sup>

A consistent association in Greek poetry between *aidôs* and kings is further evidence that instruction concerning *aidôs* belongs in discourse between princes and advisors. Witness the regular collocation of *aidoios* with *basileus* (e.g. *Th.* 80 above).<sup>28</sup> Moreover, the link between *aidôs* and kingship is explicit in the *Hymn to Demeter*, as shown in Metaneira’s words to the disguised goddess:

<sup>25</sup> Cf. C. von Erffa, *AIDOS und verwandte Begriffe in ihrer Entwicklung von Homer bis Demokrit*, *Philologus* Suppl. 30.2 (1937) 46: he claims Homer is the original because *Th.* 92 is unusual in its use of the dative. Interpretation varies according to how critics assign *aidôs* at *Th.* 92: to the king or to the audience; Neitzel (above, note 1) 39 summarizes earlier views.

<sup>26</sup> J. Gould (above, note 23) 87; further on the reciprocal quality of *aidôs*: J. Turpin, “L’Expression *aidôs kai nemesis* et les ‘actes de langage,’” *REG* 93 (1980) 352–67.

<sup>27</sup> *Meilikhios* most commonly modifies *epea*: R. Cunliffe, *A Lexicon of the Homeric Dialect* (London 1924; repr. Norman, Okla. 1963) 260. Cf. the scholiast’s comment at *Th.* 92, that the adjective is an epithet of *audê*: *Scholia Vetera in Hesiodi Theogoniam*, ed. L. DiGregorio (Milan 1975) ad loc.

<sup>28</sup> *Xenoi* and *parthenoi* are the only other social groups regularly associated with the adjective: see Gould (above, note 23) 87f.

Χαῖρε, γύναι, ἐπεὶ οὐ σε κακῶν ἄπ' ἔολπα τοκῆων  
 ἔμμεναι, ἀλλ' ἀγαθῶν ἐπί τοι πρόπει ὄμμασιν αἰδῶς  
 καὶ χάρις, ὡς εἴ περ τε θεμιστοπόλων βασιλῆων. (*H. Dem.* 213–15)

A good example of the reciprocal nature of this *aidōs* occurs at *Il.* 10.237ff. “Pick the best companion,” says Agamemnon to Diomedes, “and do not yield to *aidōs* and pick the worse, even though he be kinglier”:

μηδὲ σὺ γ' αἰδόμενος σῆσι φρεσὶ τὸν μὲν ἀρείω  
 καλλείπειν, σὺ δὲ χείρον' ὀπάσσειαι αἰδοί εἰκων,  
 ἐς γενεὴν ὀρώων, μηδ' εἰ βασιλεύτερός ἐστω.

The king is implicitly deserving of *aidōs* and possessor of it. In this way, we can align the complementary roles of *aidōs* as follows:<sup>29</sup>

<u><i>aidōs</i>—of the sender</u>	<u><i>aidōs</i>—of the receiver</u>
<i>Od.</i> 8.172 (speaker)	<i>Th.</i> 92 ( <i>laoi</i> vs. king)
<i>H. Dem.</i> 214f. (kings)	<i>Il.</i> 10.237ff. (prince vs. king)

Agamemnon’s words to Diomedes, by their tone and in their dramatic context, make clear that *aidōs* is not just associated with kings but also a fit subject on which to instruct young kings, such as Diomedes. Homeric epic offers other episodes in which there is similar mention of *aidōs* but no explicit reference to the status of the respective speakers and listeners; on close examination, these episodes, too, share the characteristic situation of prince-instruction (old adviser to young prince). The Embassy of *Iliad* 9, for instance, can be viewed as an extended dramatization of prince-instruction, with Phoenix holding the central role. The old man’s instructions concerning the *Litai* conclude with the advice to practice *aidōs*:

ὄς μὲν τ' αἰδέσεται κούρας Διὸς ἄσπον ἰούσας,  
 τὸν δὲ μέγ' ὤνησαν καὶ τ' ἔκλυον εὐχομένοιο. (*Il.* 9.508f.)

(Note that Ajax’s speech concludes on the same notion, with a call for *aidōs* directed towards the *hetairoi* this time: *Il.* 9.640.) Some episodes reverse the direction of communication but nevertheless focus on the theme of *aidōs*. One particularly interesting example is at *Od.* 3.96f., where the young prince Telemachus addresses Nestor, urging him to dispense with respectful reticence and to tell him straight out about Odysseus. Telemachus’ words contain a verbal transformation of the key noun phrase discussed above, *aidōs meilikhiē*:

<sup>29</sup> For this model of the speech-event see R. Jakobson, “Linguistics and Poetics,” in T. A. Sebeok, *Style in Language* (Cambridge, Mass. 1960) 353. For the following analysis of *Od.* 8 and *Od.* 19 I rely on Jakobson’s distinction of code and message as constituent factors in any speech-event.

μηδέ τί μ' αἰδόμενος μείλισσοο μηδ' ἐλεαίρων,  
ἀλλ' εὖ μοι κατάλεξον ὅπως ἤντησας ὀπωπῆς.

Nestor, as a king, possesses *aidōs*, which he exercises in his manner of speaking. We recall, also, that Nestor is more than just a careful speaker concerned with the content of his talk; in Homeric epic he qualifies as the *ideal speaker*, whose words “flow forth sweeter than honey”:

τοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ γλώσσης μέλιτος γλυκίων ῥέεν αὐδῆ. (*Il.* 1.249)

Compare *Th.* 84 on king's speech:

τοῦ δ' ἔπε' ἐκ στόματος ῥεῖ μέλιχα.

In addition, Nestor as an ideally long-lived king, who survives three generations, is constantly seen as instructing the rest of the Achaeans, from Agamemnon to Patroclus. We may therefore characterize the ideal Homeric king as both practitioner of the genre of prince-instruction and exemplar of its precepts. Finally, Nestor's dramatic role in the *Iliad* is to reconcile Agamemnon and Achilles: in other words, to solve a *neikos* in the *agora*.<sup>30</sup> It is this which underlies his actions from the mediating speech in Book 1 (254–84) to his interview with Patroclus in Book 11.

It appears, then, that we can find in Homeric epic not only references to a king's proper behavior and perquisites, but also dramatization of what, in the *Theogony* description of ideal kings, is merely abstract description. In the latter, kings are said to prompt *aidōs*, speak well and with powerful effect, and solve *neikea*; in the former, they actually *do* so. In fact, the *Iliad* in particular can be seen as a poem almost wholly about kingship and its abuse.<sup>31</sup> But, as I shall show now, the *Odyssey* as well has much to do with the theme of kingship, more than is generally acknowledged by critics who dwell on the adventure sequence to the neglect of the larger “frame” narrative of Books 1–8 and 13–24. We must bear in mind Odysseus' kingly status in order to appreciate the full resonances of the portions of the poem in which he plays beggar. In the same way, in Book 8, it is crucial that the audience recall Odysseus' status. Only then does one perceive that Odysseus is signalling his kingship to the audience *within* the poem, the

<sup>30</sup> On Nestor as ideal king: M. Detienne (above, note 10) 73, note 133; on the *Iliad* theme of *neikos* in the *agora*: E. Havelock, “Thoughtful Hesiod,” *YCS* 20 (1966) 70 and Nagy, *BA* 311–13.

<sup>31</sup> The abuse of kingship in the *Iliad* is specifically related to Agamemnon's lack of *aidōs*: cf. *Il.* 1.22–24 (his failure to honor Chryses) and *Il.* 1.149 (Achilles' charge of *anaideia*). On the wider connections of this *Iliad* theme (the inferior king vs. superior warrior) see O. M. Davidson, “Indo-European Dimensions of Herakles in *Iliad* 19.95–133,” *Arethusa* 13 (1980) 197–202. Irish tradition also includes a number of tales in which the generating circumstance is a king's faulty behavior or failure to observe taboos (*geasa*) attached to kingship: see M. Draak, “Some Aspects of Kingship in Pagan Ireland,” in *The Sacral Kingship* (Leiden 1959) 653.

Phaeacians. He does so by means of prince-instruction to Euryalos. Presumably, an audience familiar with archaic Greek compositions in the genre—such as the *Kheirônos hupothêkai*—would delight in Homer’s creation of dramatic ironies throughout this scene. For Odysseus the stranger yet speaks like a king, to those who know.

We have seen that Odysseus’ words to Euryalos contain two themes prominent in prince-instructions elsewhere, which account for the presence of similar phraseology. But the dramatic context itself in *Odyssey* 8 marks Odysseus’ discourse for what it is. Stanford, noting the apparent digression in the speech to Euryalos, compares it to a “short sermon on the diversity of gifts” (adducing 1 *Corinth.* 12.4ff.), and his emphasis on the authoritative tone of the speech is correct: Odysseus is delivering the archaic Greek equivalent of quoting St. Paul, using the topic and tone of traditional instructional poetry.<sup>32</sup>

What is explicit in *Th.* 86ff.—that it is the king who speaks faultlessly, winning *aidôs* and solving a *neikos* in the *agora* thereby—is acted out in the *Odyssey*. Odysseus makes a general statement to his opponent (176f.) whom the poet has already characterized as being the best looking of the nobles (8.116). Although the contrasting character in Odysseus’ short speech, the anonymous man to whom the gods have given the gift of speech, appears to be simply a foil, we must see that it is none other than *Odysseus himself*. This is disguised self-reference.<sup>33</sup> Odysseus does not have to say that he (unlike Euryalos) can speak well and with *aidôs*: he demonstrates this in his reply. If Odysseus conceals the reference to the identity of the good speaker, we recall that at this point in Scheria he still masks his own identity. The two hidden facts are significantly intertwined. Odysseus the faultless *speaker* is Odysseus son of Laertes, *king* of Ithaca.

<sup>32</sup> W. B. Stanford, *The Odyssey of Homer* (Edinburgh 1959<sup>2</sup>) vol. 1, ad loc. In fact, Odysseus in the *Iliad* is a regular sermonizer about kingship in particular: of the four examples of gnomic verses which mention the role of *basileus* in the *Iliad*, Odysseus speaks three (*Il.* 2.196; 2.204ff.; 19.182f.; the fourth is by Calchas, *Il.* 1.80); for the collection, see E. Ahrens, *Gnomen in griechischer Dichtung* (Halle 1937) 12ff. Only in the *Odyssey* are Odysseus’ pronouncements disguised.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. T. Berres, “Das zeitliche Verhältnis von Theogonie und Odyssee,” *Hermes* 103 (1975) 134, who views Odysseus’ self-reference as evidence for an adapting *Odyssey*-poet’s desire for self-portraiture. Since Odysseus, *the king*, refers to himself, the arguments of West and Wilamowitz (that the *Odyssey* description does not fit a king, therefore Hesiod is prior) are not valid: cf. West (above, note 2) 183; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Die Ilias und Homer* (Berlin 1916) 478f. Also insupportable is F. Solmsen’s contention that the *Odyssey* passage leaves out all reference to kings (a point used to argue Homeric priority): cf. “The ‘Gift’ of Speech in Homer and Hesiod,” *TAPA* 85 (1954) 10. Ancient critics, conscious of social roles, noted Odysseus’ kingly status: the scholiast to *Th.* 86 (above, note 27) selects Odysseus as the prime example of a king (citing *Od.* 4.693) to elucidate the Hesiod passage on ideal kingship.



In other details as well the *Odyssey* passage offers a dramatic version of the abstract king-ideal of the *Theogony*. (Again, this is not to say that Homer “dramatizes” a pre-existing text of Hesiod, but that both use common themes in different modes.) For the contest between Odysseus and Euryalos is actually described by Alcinoos as a *neikos* during an *agôn* (8.238f.); the poet calls it a *neikos* as well (8.158 *neikese*). By winning, Odysseus acts to solve the *neikos*.<sup>34</sup> Note that *agôn* is a formulaic variant for *agora* in epic diction, and that the scene of the contest has in fact been described twice already in Book 8 as the *agora* (8.109, 156).

Not only are all the terms of the *Theogony* description thus acted out (speaking; *aidôs*; solving *neikos* in the *agora*). The poet of the *Odyssey* has prepared his audience to view the contest with Euryalos as being related to kingship. What I have called the “looking on” motif, prominent in the two passages under discussion (*Th.* 85, *Od.* 8.173) is also used to introduce Telemachus’ arrival at the Ithacan *agora* and Odysseus’ own arrival at the Phaeacians’ *agora*:<sup>35</sup>

βῆ ῥ’ ἴμεν εἰς ἀγορήν, παλάμη δ’ ἔχε χάλκεον ἔγχος,  
οὐκ οἶος, ἅμα τῷ γε κύνες πόδας ἀργοὶ ἔποντο.  
θεσπεσίην δ’ ἄρα τῷ γε χάριν κατέχευεν Ἀθήνη.  
τὸν δ’ ἄρα πάντες λαοὶ ἐπερχόμενον θεῖντο. . . . (*Od.* 2.10ff.)

καρπαλίμως δ’ ἐμπληντο βροτῶν ἀγοραί τε καὶ ἔδραι  
ἀγρομένων· πολλοὶ δ’ ἄρα θηήσαντο ἰδόντες  
νῖον Λαέρταο δαΐφρονα. τῷ δ’ ἄρ’ Ἀθήνη  
θεσπεσίην κατέχευε χάριν κεφαλῇ τε καὶ ὤμοις. . . . (*Od.* 8.16ff.)

<sup>34</sup> See R. Martin, *Healing, Sacrifice and Battle: Amêchania and Related Concepts in Early Greek Poetry* (Innsbruck 1983) 65–76 on the Greek notion of contest as solution to difficulties.

<sup>35</sup> The primary and most extended expression of this “looking-on” motif comes at *Il.* 12.312 (the people look on Glaukos and Sarpedon as gods). It is part of a larger theme, that of the “honor of gods”: one is honored (*Il.* 9.155), repaid (*Il.* 9.302f.), welcomed (*Il.* 22.435) like “a god.”

Other instances of the theme: at *Il.* 22.394 Hector is prayed to “like a god”; at *Od.* 7.11—a scene preparatory to the passage under discussion—Alcinoos, clearly a king, is said to be heard “like a god” by the *dêmos*. Note that, in the two passages cited in the text, the pouring of *kharis* by Athena is closely associated with the audience’s favorable reaction to the figures of Telemachus and Odysseus. This accords precisely with the association of *kharis* and *aidôs* in *H. Dem.* 214–15, quoted above: the possessor of *kharis* transmits *aidôs* (and therefore receives it also). Finally, let me cite Pindar *Ol.* 1.30f., *χάρις δ’ ἄπερ ἅπαντα τεύχει τὰ μείλιχα θνατοῖς*, in order to indicate the traditional nature of the dictional equivalences among terms which describe reciprocal behavior:

*aidôs* + *kharis* (*H. Dem.* 214f.)  
*kharis* + *ta meilikha* (*Ol.* 1.30f.)  
*to meilikhon* + *aidôs* (*Theognis* 85f.; 365)  
*aidoi meilikhiêi* (*Th.* 92, *Od.* 8.172).

In the first passage, the context is concerned with the uncertainty as to whether the young prince will be king of Ithaca and gain a permanent place on the throne of his father, which he now temporarily occupies (2.14). Interestingly, his speaking ability is singled out for mention as the characteristic that most marks him for the position of king. Antinoos says:

Τηλέμαχ', ἧ μάλα δὴ σε διδάσκουσιν θεοὶ αὐτοὶ  
 ὑψαγόρην τ' ἔμεναι καὶ θαρσαλέως ἀγορεύειν·  
 μὴ σέ γ' ἐν ἀμφιάλω Ἰθάκῃ βασιλῆα Κρονίων  
 ποιήσειεν, ὅ τοι γενεῆ πατρώϊόν ἐστιν. (*Od.* 1.384–87)

So too in Scheria there is the possibility that the new arrival will knock the islanders out of contention and become Nausicaa's husband. The poet plays with the resonances of a folklore motif, the royal marriage test.<sup>36</sup> Royal marriage seems far from connected to the topic of prince-instruction, but as it turns out, in the *Odyssey* marriage and kingship have everything to do with one another. Penelope and the rule of Ithaca are indissociable. I pointed out earlier that *Odyssey* 19 contains an extended fragment of the Ruler's Truth ideology, in form resembling something directly taken from prince-instruction poetry. Who gives this apparent digression within the poem? None other than the disguised king again, Odysseus.

Both in his talk with Penelope and in his reply to Euryalos, Odysseus allows his interlocutor to know that he is the king—provided the interlocutor recognizes the genre in which Odysseus is speaking.<sup>37</sup> In Book 8, he seals his coded signal with a clear sign consisting of a spectacular discus-throw. As if to contrast with the final revelation of his status, Odysseus begins the throw while still wrapped in his *pharos* (8.186); the throw literally lowers the status of the Phaeacians as it reveals Odysseus' own: they cower to the ground beneath the flung discus (190), which

<sup>36</sup> Such resonances were certainly possible for an ancient audience: witness the multi-form, attested in cult, in which Odysseus competes in a foot-race to win Penelope and makes dedications to Athena for his victory: Pausanias 3.12.4, discussed in M. Detienne, "The Sea-Crow," in *Myth, Religion and Society*, ed. R. Gordon (Cambridge and Paris 1981) 24f. (= a translation of the chapter in *Les Ruses de l'intelligence: la mêtis des grecs* [Paris 1974] 202–43.) Further on such folktale elements in the competition for Penelope: U. Hoelscher, "The Transformation from Folktale to Epic," in *Homer: Tradition and Invention*, ed. B. Fenik (Leiden 1978).

<sup>37</sup> Odysseus' parallel role as poet, manipulating genres of discourse, once more makes it easy to lose sight of the artful composer Homer, who puts the genre of instruction-poetry into Odysseus' mouth for purposes of the wider composition. The layering evident in Odysseus' speech at *Od.* 8.167ff. is thus another piece of evidence (like Odysseus' lies and his adventure-telling) for the theory that the *Odyssey's* overriding concern is with the practice of narrative *per se*: see T. Todorov, "Primitive Narrative," in *Poetics of Prose*, transl. R. Howard (Ithaca, N.Y. 1977) 53–65 (a translation of *Poétique de la prose* [Paris 1971]).

flies “past all the *sêmata*.” While the discus surpasses these “distinguishing marks,” the result of the throw is *itself* a *sêma*, one which Athena validates in person with a proclamation containing a double meaning:

Καί κ' ἀλαός τοι, ξεῖνε, διακρίνειε τὸ σῆμα  
 ἀμφαφῶων ἐπεὶ οὐ τι μεμιγμένον ἐστὶν ὀμίλῳ,  
 ἀλλὰ πολὺ πρῶτον· σὺ δὲ θάρσει τόνδε γ' ἄεθλον·  
 οὐ τις Φαιήκων τόδε γ' ἕξεται οὐδ' ὑπερήσει. (*Od.* 8.195–98)

The key to the riddle is contained in an unusual catachresis, for only here (196) in Homeric poetry is *homilos* used to refer to inanimate objects rather than to a throng of persons, usually warriors. The significance of the fact becomes more clear when we note that *homilos* can be used to describe the spectators at a contest (as at *Il.* 23.804, 813) and actually is used of the Phaeacian onlookers in this very contest at *Od.* 8.109.

Athena's brief *epinikion* commemorating Odysseus' throw can be decoded to mean that Odysseus stands out from the “crowd” just as his discus is “not mixed in with the *homilos*.” The message of Athena is exactly that which Odysseus transmits concerning himself (the “speaker”) in his words to Euryalos: cf. 8.172, μετὰ δὲ πρέπει ἀγρομένοισιν. “Even a blind man” can distinguish Odysseus' sign, says Athena; the statement is ironically half-fulfilled soon after the contest when Demodocus, the blind bard, tells the story of Odysseus in the Trojan Horse but does not recognize the person who requested the tale, Odysseus (8.487ff.). This “sign” that has “surpassed all others,” then, is iconic for Odysseus' status as surpassing speaker, athlete, and king.

In Book 19, a *sêma* again follows Odysseus' coded use of prince-instruction in the conversation with Penelope. This time the sign that alerts the audience to the presence of other coded messages is the brooch that Penelope recognizes from Odysseus' description.<sup>38</sup> Following Nagy's recent demonstration that poetry itself can be a *sêma* in epic, I now suggest that in both the *Odyssey* 8 and 19 episodes, Odysseus is delivering *two sêmata*: those designated as such (the discus-throw, the brooch) and the undesignated use of a genre of discourse as a code to his listener.<sup>39</sup>

In Scheria, only keen-minded Alcinoos succeeds in interpreting the sign, though the audience of the poem appreciates its meaning: it requires a king to know one. In Book 19, suspense arises from the use of the hidden *sêma*: will Penelope accomplish the task of reading Odysseus'

<sup>38</sup> On the ironies of this entire scene see B. Fenik, *Studies in the Odyssey* (Wiesbaden 1974) 20–25; on Odysseus' clothes as a coded message, see G. Nagy, “*Sêma* and *Noêsis*: Some Illustrations,” *Arethusa* 16 (1983) 36f.

<sup>39</sup> On poetry as *sêma*: Nagy (above, note 38) 51. The general symmetry between the Phaeacian and Ithacan recognition scenes is outlined by Fenik (above, note 38) 53–55.

genre? But the queen, clever woman, king's proper wife (herself *like* a good king: *Od.* 19.108f.), must no doubt have already understood the speaker for what he is—not beggar but king, instructor of princes.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>40</sup> A shorter version of this paper was delivered at the APA convention in Philadelphia in December 1982. For useful suggestions, I wish to thank the anonymous *TAPA* referees and Gregory Nagy.